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
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
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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORT
DECEPTION AND TACTICAL AIRLIFT

MAJOR PALMER VOYLES 86-2610
"insights into tomorrow"

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REPORT NUMBER 86-2610

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

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PREFACE

Deception is one of the oldest and most effective weapons in warfare, yet almost a forgotten art. The arguments of quality and quantity seem to have replaced the need for deceptive measures. Soviet deception doctrine and its' active application in military operations yields added American considerations in the use and recognition of these deceptive methods. The increased mobility requirements of our expanding conventional forces requires an increased tactical airlift role in active hostilities. This study examines the deception process and deception techniques in order to create an appreciation for the practice and use of deception in the employment of tactical airlift. It advocates the use of deception in hostilities that may include any mission where tactical airlift is a factor from Third World conflict to a declared war. The discussion develops the deception process by examining deception methods, success factors, and operational considerations. It details tactical airlift missions that support active hostilities, and discusses the application of deception in those missions. The goal is to create and awareness of deception and the impact it can have in the successful accomplishment of tactical airlift operations.



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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Palmer Voyles graduated from Auburn University at Auburn, Alabama on 6 June 1973 with a Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering and a Commission from the Reserve Officer Training Corps. In September of 1973 he reported to Mather AFB, California to attend Undergraduate Navigator Training. He graduated in June 1974 and was assigned as a C-130 navigator in the Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System at Pope AFB, North Carolina. In March 1978 he attended Undergraduate Pilot Training at Vance AFB, Oklahoma, and upon graduation in March 1979 was reassigned to Pope AFB as a C-130 pilot. From February 1982 to February 1983 he served as a Tactical Airlift Liaison Officer with the 2nd Infantry Division and the Combined Field Army (ROK/US) at Camp Red Cloud Army Installation, Republic of Korea. Following this remote tour, Major Voyles returned to Pope AFB where he served as an air operations officer for the wing special operations division. While serving in this capacity, he became interested in deception and how it might enhance the tactical airlift mission. After graduation from Air Command and Staff College, Major Voyles will remain on the faculty at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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REPORT NUMBER 86-2610
AUTHOR(S) MAJOR PALMER VOYLES, USAF
TITLE DECEPTION AND TACTICAL AIRLIFT

I. Purpose: To create an appreciation for the practice and use of deception both in training and contingencies, and to analyze the deception process and deception techniques for tactical airlift missions of the Military Airlift Command. The use of deception is advocated with any form of hostility where tactical airlift is a factor from Third World conflict to a declared war.

II. Problem: The increased capabilities of our conventional forces requires an expanding role for combat airlift forces. To successfully counter the threat from our primary opponent, the Soviets, we must integrate the deception process into the deployment of our forces. Current doctrine reflects this need, but we have yet to actively plan and use deception in ever expanding tactical airlift missions.

III. Data: The Soviets incorporate a deception doctrine that embraces every level of command. Soviet commanders believe that deception provides force readiness, survivability, and acts as a force multiplier. The Soviets regard deception and its' application more important now than in the past, and are quite willing and able to use integrated deceptive measures in military operations. With the expanding role of combat airlift forces, our ability to counter the Soviet threat lies in our ability to not only apply deception techniques in our

CONTINUED

operations, but to recognize them as well. These deception methods are concealment, imitation, disinformation, overload, maneuver and improvisation. Associated with these methods are the success factors of secrecy, plausibility, adaptability, predisposition and initiative. These deception methods and success factors must be combined with considerations for the media, operations/communications security, command and control, and intelligence. This combination then becomes the active application of the deception process. Before the process can begin, it must have the approval of the military commander, and it must complement the overall mission or achievement of the objective. The integrated use of deception in airlift operations requires prompt, thorough planning and swift, decisive execution implying a high degree of readiness and high standards in training.

IV. Conclusion: With the expanding role of tactical airlift, it behooves military commanders and planners to become knowledgeable of deception and its implications for not only offensive, but defensive reasons as well. Air Force Manual 1-1 and Air Force Regulation 55-49 is the doctrine and guidance that reflects this need. The active application of deception can provide the basis and the means that will determine the difference between victory and defeat.

Chapter One

A DECEPTION PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to create an appreciation for the practice and use of deception in the employment of tactical airlift. It will analyze the deception process and deception techniques for tactical airlift missions of the Military Airlift Command.

The use of deception advocated here will not be limited to a particular level of conflict. Rather, it is advocated for use with any form of active hostility with tactical airlift support. Since tactical airlift can be used in a variety of supporting missions, these hostilities may include any mission where tactical airlift is a factor from Third World conflict to a declared war.

THE LOGIC IN DECEPTION

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. (3:66-67)

-Sun Tzu 500 B.C.

The words of Sun Tzu illustrate that deception has been used throughout history and dates to man's earliest struggles. The Trojan Horse, Hannibal's ruse at Cannae, Washington's boat ride

across the Delaware, and the elaborate schemes of World War II in North Africa and France trace the historical path of deception in warfare. No matter the time period, advancement in weaponry, or mode of warfare deception has remained a companion of man's struggle against an enemy. However, since World War II the American employment of deception as a tactic has yielded to today's sophisticated weapons, while our Soviet opponents have not forgotten how complimentary the tactic of deception can be.

The Soviets consider deception an inherent part of their military plans and operations. They view deception as an art, and have developed a doctrine called maskirovka which embraces every level of command. Their commanders believe it provides force readiness, survivability, and acts as a force multiplier (6:25). In short, the Soviets regard deception and its' application more important now than in the past, and are quite willing and able to use integrated deceptive measures in military operations. To successfully counter this threat from our primary opponent, we must integrate deception into the the deployment of our forces. Current doctrine reflects this need, but we have yet to actively plan and use deception in ever expanding tactical airlift missions.

The recent commander of the Military Airlift Command, General Thomas M. Ryan, Jr., reflected on the future expanding role of combat airlift forces:

It's become increasingly apparent to the leadership of this country that while we develop more capable conventional forces, we must concurrently develop the mobility resources to quickly deploy those

forces into battle and, once deployed, resupply them. (9:6)

This requirement for increased mobility makes it all the more important that we apply our stated doctrine to these tactical airlift missions.

Air Force Regulation 55-49, our doctrine for tactical operations, states the following concerning the use of deception in the tactical airlift mission:

Although significant coordination is required for tactical airlift operations, it need not be excessively time-consuming. Therefore, deception may and should be used during this activity to mislead the enemy as to mission load, flight route, and destination. (11:2-2)

As the words of General Ryan proclaim and the guidance advises, the successful role of tactical airlift will remain an important part of future conflict. As Air Force Manual 1-1 implies, it behooves military planners and commanders to become knowledgeable of deception and its implications for not only offensive, but defensive reasons as well (10:2-16). Deception can provide the basis and the means that will determine the difference between victory and defeat.

METHODOLOGY

The remaining chapters of this paper will develop the art of deception, tactical airlift missions that support active hostilities, and discuss the application of deception in those airlift missions. From this discussion, my goal is to create an awareness of deception and specifically how important it can be

in the successful accomplishment of tactical airlift operations.

Chapter Two

THE ART OF DECEPTION

THE PROCESS OF DECEPTION

A broad definition of deception is the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to gain a competitive advantage (12:1-1). The process of deception is much like that of the communication process: there must be a sender, a means of conveyance, a receiver, and most importantly, a method of feedback so that a degree of success can be determined. These deception players become the military commander, the planners, the opponent and the implementers. Before the process can begin, it must have the approval of the military commander, and it must complement the overall mission or achievement of the objective (11:1-3). This chapter will discuss the types of deception, success factors in the deception process, deception methods and the impact of deception.

TYPES OF DECEPTION

There are two types of deception which the players must consider. Strategic deception is the large-scale, long term projections of false intelligence to assist in attaining theater objectives (12:1-1). This affects the outcomes of wars or campaigns. Tactical deception is a smaller-scale, shorter term action to achieve surprise on the battlefield (12:1-1). This affects the outcomes of battles or small engagements. The possibility exists that a combination of the two types of deception could be applied to achieve desired results in active

conflict. This paper will concentrate on the strategic side of tactical deception rather than on the specific battlefield or air maneuvers performed to gain the advantage.

FACTORS IN DECEPTION SUCCESS

There are several factors that contribute to the success of the deception process. These are secrecy, plausibility, adaptability, target predisposition and initiative (2:167).

The first factor is that of secrecy in organization and coordination. This implies quite obviously that the enemy must not realize that deception is being used. The strictest security must be present in order for the deception to have the slightest chance for success. The security intent here is to protect your real purpose for the battlefield as well as the fact that a deceptive action will be used. Indeed, this would call for excellent organization and coordination for the total elimination of security leaks, which is a difficult goal to achieve. Deception experts Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, both of the Naval Postgraduate School, argue that deceiving one's own troops is a normal byproduct of deception, such as was used by German General Hans von Griefenberg in numerous successful campaigns in World War II (2:167). But the fact remains that even without total security, the enemy still must make the decision as to what is real and what is not.

The second factor is concerned with plausibility and confirmation of the lie. The deceptive action must be reasonable in that it would seem logical to the enemy that it could happen,

and the enemy must be able to confirm the action with more than one source. In other words, the action must be within your military capability, and it must be compatible with your overall objectives. Then and only then, will the deception become believable.

Adaptability is the third factor and perhaps the most important in conflict. This is where the very important aspect of feedback concerning the deception comes into play. With knowledge of the enemy's reaction to your deception, an opportunity may present itself to further deceive the enemy. As the action unfolds, if the deceiver remains flexible to changing circumstances and events, and reacts to feedback by adapting the plausible original deception, then further advantage could be gained. This factor was used quite successfully during the Normandy invasion in World War II when the Germans were still convinced of a second allied invasion at Calais. General Patton was provided fictional forces that were used as a threat on Calais causing the Germans to divert resources for two months after the Normandy invasion began. Adaptability was a tremendous aid toward firmly establishing the beachhead at Normandy (2:171).

The fourth aspect has cultural links and has probably been the "thorn in the side" of American efforts to date. Target predispositions can play a large part in the eventual success of the deceptive action. This success factor dwells on the enemy's preset notions, ideas, customs or traits and how the enemy will react to the deception. If the deceiver knows the probable

reaction, then the deception can be designed around that reaction. Here, the enemy feels no pressure since the deception is within the norm, and he reacts according to the norm. The Indian government used American predisposition to enter the nuclear family of nations. With an Indian guarantee of peaceful nuclear research, a trusting United States continued nuclear sales to India. When the Indians exploded a nuclear weapon, those trusting American eyes were opened to India's goals (2:172).

The final success factor is that of strategic initiative, or offensive rather than defensive operations. Theodore Roosevelt expressed this concept very well:

Far better it is to dare mighty things to win glorious triumphs, even though checkered by failure, than to take rank with those poor spirits who neither enjoy much nor suffer much, because they live in the grey twilight that knows not victory nor defeat. (1:127)

Deception plays a greater role if efforts are more for the offense rather than defensive in nature. An obvious advantage exists if you are able to act rather than to react. The most important aspect here is that of time. It takes time to plan and implement a deception, and if the enemy is on the defensive, time and resources are critical for the battlefield, and reactionary measures are all that remain. This happened to the Germans in World War II as the tide of battle turned against them and time, resources, and information became critical (2:174).

DECEPTION METHODS

There are six broad and classical methods of deception. They are concealment, imitation, disinformation, overload, demonstration maneuver and improvisation (6:28, 12:4-18).

Much of the enemy's intelligence involves visual detection, therefore concealment has been of primary concern for centuries. Concealment involves camouflage, terrain masking, light and sound masking, troop and aircraft movement, electronic signatures, and the use of natural concealment such as darkness and inclement weather. In 1942, the United States west coast was considered primary for a Japanese invasion or air attack. Extensive and elaborate methods were devised to disguise aircraft plants in California and Washington state. The Army Corps of Engineers created "suburban" settings among heavy industrialized areas that was considered the greatest deception effort ever undertaken (7:112).

Imitation is the realistic representation of objects to deliberately deceive the enemy. Today's imitation involves more than just a wooden replica of an aircraft or tank, in that sophisticated surveillance techniques will expose that tank as exactly what it is, wood. Coupled with the particular decoy must be the signature the original would emit. One historic example from the American Civil War will illustrate imitation. Confederate Major General John Magruder averted a superior Union Army attack by simply boring out logs and painting them black to resemble hundreds of cannon he did not actually possess (4:4).

Disinformation is the classic form of deception and involves the supply of plausible, incorrect information to the enemy in order to frighten or bluff, cause inaction or create concessions. This method requires close coordination at all levels to be effective. During World War II, OPERATION MINCEMEAT involved the "planting" of false information on a corpse allowed to wash ashore, in order to deceive the Germans of actual Allied plans on the invasion of Sicily (4:121).

Overload is directly connected with disinformation and provides the enemy with excessive information which he must digest in order to make a decision. The most important advantage here is that it gains time. Even with the most sophisticated intelligence techniques, too much information causes problems in that it requires time to decipher what is real and relevant, and what is not. OPERATION FORTITUDE was similar in nature to OPERATION MINCEMEAT during World War II, except that numerous "plants" were used. German records after the war showed about 250 different reports concerning the time and place of the Normandy invasion (4:129).

The fifth method is that of demonstration maneuver, which involves demonstrating false battle intentions. This has been used quite effectively in the past, but has several drawbacks. This method involves additional personnel and equipment located great distances from actual operations. If the enemy were to detect the deception, grave consequences could result. As General Sherman approached Atlanta, he met stiff Confederate opposition and could not take the city. He employed the ruse of

moving his men first away from Atlanta, then around the city to the weaker southern flank, where he attacked and took the city at dawn. Sherman gave the impression of retreat causing the Confederates to become confused and thoroughly deceived (4:15).

The final deception method is that of improvisation. Improvisation alone is considered extremely hazardous, but very effective, and can compliment previously mentioned methods very nicely. Clever disguises of men and equipment can buy time in a critical tactical situation. For the Entebbe rescue, the Israelis used a duplicate of Idi Amin's Mercedes 600 automobile to buy time for the additional C-130s to land with normal runway lighting (5:17).

THE IMPACT OF DECEPTION

Deception is frequently considered a weapon of the weak and that the strong become arrogant in an approach to war, thereby conceding the advantage to the weak (2:1). This arrogant approach, backed by unlimited resources and the latest weapon systems, is actually a deceit within itself. Through progress, nations can fool themselves into an invincible state creating their own unfortunate deception. Michael Mihalka proved the point in a paper detailing the Soviet grand deception to attain military conventional and nuclear parity with the United States (2:50). By advocating arms reduction, Mr. Mihalka maintains the Soviets bought sorely needed time to modernize and expand without causing a drastic American response. It took years to reach the objective, but the effort proved that deception can be

a tool of the weakest as well as the strongest, and that it can be applied quite effectively on any scale.

The impact of deception, as shown in the above example and as detailed in Air Force Regulation 55-49, should not be a means by itself to obtain the ends. For the Soviets, the arms reduction ruse was but a tool to reach parity easier, cheaper and quicker. The deception plan complemented the overall objective and blended cohesively with the operational ends. The tactical situation must present an enemy that is susceptible to deception, opportunity to deceive must exist, time and resources must be available, and you must know your enemy and how that enemy will react (2:155). Only when these prerequisites are satisfied will deception play a proper role toward mission success.

This chapter has developed the process of deception, types of deception, success factors, deception methods, and the impact deception can have. Chapter Three will discuss the types of tactical airlift missions and how the deception process should be integrated in tactical airlift operations.

Chapter Three

THE MISSIONS AND DECEPTION CONSIDERATIONS

Tactical airlift operations provide many opportunities for deception. The sophistication of the opponent, and the amount of his support from an allied source will determine but not limit the type of deception employed. Higher sophistication obviously requires greater resources and management, thus more opportunities for deception to work on the minds and the will of the enemy.

Numerous guidelines imply the active application of the deception process in the planning and execution of missions (10:1-3, 12:1-1). This chapter will explain the various missions in tactical airlift, and use a deception model to illustrate some considerations in this active application.

TACTICAL AIRLIFT MISSIONS

There are three distinct categories of tactical airlift missions that support active conflict. They are airland operations, airborne operations, and special operations augmentation.

Airland operations involve the delivery of combat units, materiel, and personnel to or within an area held by friendly forces in support of peacetime or combat operations. This method of support was used throughout the Viet Nam conflict such as occurred at the siege at Khe Sanh.

Airborne operations are delivery and resupply of airborne units into territory held by hostile forces, or delivery of combat-configured units directly into combat positions. This may include airland or airdrop operations during contingency conditions. The well known example here was the paratroop airdrops during the D-Day invasion of Normandy in World War II.

Tactical airlift also has the capability to augment special operations forces to include both airland and airdrop missions, leaflet drops, flare drops, loudspeaker missions, command and control missions, and classified missions to include infiltration/exfiltration of forces. A recent example was the airdrop operations during the Grenada intervention.

These missions require certain considerations for the deception process to blend with operations, and to establish effective deception that is persuasive, timely, and diverse. To meet these objectives, deception must be applied under certain rules of thumb and afforded certain considerations which can be displayed in a deception model.

A DECEPTION MODEL

Chapter Two discussed the deception process in the types, success factors, and methods of deception. Figure 3-1 graphically illustrates the integration of these toward the desired mission success. The model depicts conflict at the center with the supporting tactical airlift roles of airland, airborne, and special operations missions. The six methods of deception and the five success factors should be used in close




Figure 3-1 The Role of Deception

harmony before any deceptive plan be implemented. First, as the model displays, certain rules of thumb and four other areas should be considered.

The three rules of thumb to consider are that the deception should be pragmatic, single points of contact used as much as possible, and a "need to know" status used concerning the mission. First, the deception becomes pragmatic when it is logical and plausible, and fits well with the scenario, force capabilities, and overall mission objectives. This would include full support by both the commander and the implementers. For instance, a deceptive plan for an airdrop to an obviously unsuitable area would not complement the mission. Secondly, the mission should be conducted using single points of contact wherever and whenever possible to minimize security leaks and risks, and to avoid unnecessary exposure in all mission phases. This becomes very important in the coordination game while planning and deploying the mission in the early stages. The idea is to eliminate exposure such as would occur at an enroute staging base without a single point of contact to organize enroute support. Lastly, a "need to know" status should be considered to adopt the principle of economy of force. Again, this minimizes security leaks, provides for an optimal size force, and most importantly simplifies the communication's process.

In addition to the rules of thumb, other factors come into play in the application of deception. Important considerations exist in the role of intelligence, the media, command and

control, operations/communications security, and also training or contingency situations.

The very important role of intelligence cannot be overemphasized. Historically, American intelligence has not been successful in terms of timeliness and accuracy. The missing prisoners at Son Tay and the substantial resistance on Grenada are but two examples in this area (1:139). Timely, accurate intelligence is an aid to the deceptive plan through knowing the enemy, his capabilities and limitations, and of his organization of forces and command structure. Additionally, feedback intelligence will account for the important aspect of adaptability which may further aid the overall objective.

Since the Grenada operation much has been said concerning the role of the media in reporting United States military operations. The debate rages on and both sides have valid arguments on how these operations should be covered. A recent editorial by Russell E. Dougherty stated the role of the press quite convincingly:

The military must be willing to recognize the right of the public--and of the press--to know what is happening, except in those rare situations where disclosure would clearly endanger the national interest. It is not too much to ask that our free press freely accept the responsibility to be responsible. (8:8)

The press or Air Force Public Affairs office could be used both as a security aid and a deceptive aid. Following the single point of contact rule, a knowledgeable yet responsible press representative could inform the press pool of impending military

operations. This follows a return to a more cohesive press such as existed in World War II. In May 1967, when both Israel and Egypt were completely mobilized due to existing tensions, the Israeli government used the press to report that it was much too late for Israel to go to war with a mobilized Egypt and that as a result Israel was releasing reserve troops (2:128). The informed yet responsible Israeli press cooperated, and Israel achieved a complete surprise attack on 5 June 1967. This allowed Israel to buy time and created a plausible deceptive plan. The press could and should be used in highly beneficial ways such as occurred in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

Missions such as the Iranian rescue attempt and the Grenada operation have created considerable study in the area of command and control. Yet joint operations competitiveness, command accessibility, and enroute control of assets still remain problem areas in command and control. Competitiveness among the armed services sorely restricts the effectiveness of fighting units. This competitiveness breeds duplication of effort and violates the success factor of secrecy in organization and coordination. To provide for adaptability in the deception process, commanders need to be accessible to react to an ever changing situation. Decentralization and secure, reliable communications have aided tremendously in this area. Finally, enroute control of airlift assets in remote regions is a continuing dilemma. Pre-coordinated schedules should eliminate flight following and status reporting should be accomplished by exception and only by predetermined schedule tolerances. Enroute

support should be along the lines of a prearranged system with unrelated mission parties using the single point of contact and trusted agent approach. Command and control in the deception process requires a close military/political interface, lower level decision making, and a readily available information flow.

Operations and communications security (Opsec/Comsec) literally impacts every phase of a military operation. The importance here was established in Chapter Two and incorporates the factors of secrecy, single points of contact, and a "need to know" status. Without effective Opsec/Comsec, the deception simply cannot succeed. But even with leaks, the situation could be adapted to disinformation to deny the enemy intelligence and overload his decision making process.

The final area for consideration involves training versus contingency situations. Soviet maskirovka requires an active application of deception in all situations (6:27). Obviously, time and resources will dictate this active application, but unless we practice in peacetime, we cannot hope to be effective in combat. As the discussion in the final chapter emphasizes, we must attempt to adapt the six methods of deception in our daily operations as much as those time and resources will possibly allow.

Chapter Four

ANALYSIS: DECEPTION AND THE MISSION

DECEPTION APPLICATION

Airland, airborne and special operations support many areas of conflict. These operations provide prime opportunities to use the deceptive methods of concealment, imitation, disinformation, overload, demonstration maneuver and improvisation.

Concealment of aircraft activity and the related support is very difficult to achieve, especially with a large tactical aircraft. Any increase in aircraft activity can reveal to the enemy that something is happening, therefore it becomes necessary to use deception techniques. If surprise is achieved at the objective, then mission accomplishment is enhanced. Hence, the deceptive effort should focus on getting to the objective undetected. This can be accomplished through concealing enroute departures and arrivals with smaller force, night movements, and using inactive aerodrome areas at all these staging or enroute facilities.

Imitation requires much more time and expense to be successful, but can be one of the more effective forms of deception. Dummy aircraft and airfields with periodic arrivals and departures can confuse the enemy and cause decision delays. Realistically painted bomb craters on active airfields can even mislead sophisticated satellite imagery. Changing aircraft markings and tail numbers, and disguising aircraft to look like other types of aircraft can also be effective. Again, imitation

can be highly successful but is very time and resource restricted.

Disinformation and overload are deceptive techniques with unlimited options. Frequently used deceptive reports by offices such as the State Department are regularly scheduled exercise participation or joint force maneuvers. A previously mentioned but rarely used example illicit the use of the public affairs office or the media to report and publish political activities or statements, and false stand-downs to aid in the deception. Overload again follows very closely with disinformation and could employ the use of notional or decoy forces, and simultaneous multiple maneuvers near the objective area to confuse and delay enemy responses.

Demonstration maneuvers could involve both active and passive means. Active measures could include large formation flows from a staging base with periodic smaller force breakaways near the objective. This would tend to confuse enemy tracking and disguise actual target intent. Fake infiltrations and airdrops would also serve the same purpose. Passive measures could include plants in the form of agents, corpses, or nearby allied flareups. This would serve to create false intelligence information or divert attention from the real objective.

Finally, improvisation as a deceptive measure should depend on time and circumstance and be afforded some consideration prior to its' use. As stated previously, improvisation is very dangerous but can be quite effective in the deception process.

The previous suggestions with the six methods of deception are not all inclusive and the use of these techniques are only limited by the particular situation in the size of the force, type of mission, location of the objective, and creativity of the planner. This active application of deception is paramount for success and should begin in the planning phase.

PLANNING PHASE

The planning phase should incorporate a tightly knit planning cell and deceptive measures should not be forgotten in this early stage. The planning cell should consider operation in isolation and at varying locations while insuring secure communications means and command accessibility. Signature elements increase and denote a higher intensity than normal through personnel absence and coordination to home units. A plausible denial or cover story would be effective at this point. The relevancy, necessity, and impact of volumes of hard-copy documentation and its' distribution should also be considered in the planning phase. The information explosion could take a back seat when mission success is on the line. Finally, to avert jeopardizing the entire planning phase, unit notifications should always be performed using communications out procedures. The successful application of these measures in the planning phase should increase chances for success in mission execution.

EXECUTION PHASE

The execution phase should be the effort to implement the planned deceptions and the operation. Here, the planners consider the deployment, employment, and redeployment of the airlift forces to support the conflict.

First consideration should be given to the alert, show, and briefings for the aircrew force. Again, communications out procedures should be used for previously mentioned reasons, and the briefing locations should be dispersed for larger forces.

During the deployment and redeployment phases, particular emphasis should be given to stereotyped patterns, phased dispersals, and communications. The prelaunch sequence of aircraft rigging, loading, briefing, and launching creates intensified area activity providing a convenient signature not only for enemy reconnaissance but for the local media as well. Phased dispersals would eliminate this flurry of activity and decrease or eliminate that telltale movement signature element. Additionally, the increased communications during this time will often provide more leaks than the increased ramp activity. Therefore, preplanned leaks and false information in the deceptive plan will aid the overall effort.

The employment phase entails the use of particular tactical maneuvers and is not the purpose or intent of this paper. Rather, it will suffice that planners should employ the use of available yet forgotten methods and approaches to accomplishing the mission. Signature elements should be considered throughout this phase to include visual, sonic, satellite, electronic, and

olfactory means. Deception options should include decoy forces and notional forces to disinform and overload enemy command structures. Signs of preparation with reposition and varied patterns of activity should be used to take advantage of a predisposed enemy mind. All of these are very straightforward and convincing arguments for the use of deception options.

CONCLUSION

This paper has advocated the active application of deception with tactical airlift support of active conflict. The deception process was developed and compared to the communication process where a sender, a means of conveyance, a receiver, and a method of feedback frame the process. The success factors of secrecy, plausibility, adaptability, predisposition and initiative were discussed to emphasize complementary, flexible, and believable deceptive plans for the mission. The deception methods of concealment, imitation, disinformation, overload, maneuver and improvisation were detailed as the classical methods used throughout history. Then the deception methods and success factors were combined with rules of thumb and considerations for the media, opsec/comsec, command and control, and intelligence to form a model that illustrated the active application of deception for both training and contingencies. Finally, the discussion emphasized that the integrated use of deception requires prompt, thorough planning and swift, decisive execution that implies a high degree of readiness and high standards in training.

In an open American society with a reputation for honesty and human rights principles, the mere implication of the use of deception in warfare draws tremendous debate. In the Soviet versus American quantity versus quality argument, the combination of quality and deception just may be an unbeatable team. The fact remains that man plays the biggest role in this highly technical age of warfare, but regardless of technology, man can still be deceived!

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